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FOREWORD
In the post-Soviet period, the Caucasus region
has been a source of chronic instability and conflict:
Unresolved “frozen conflicts” in Abkhazia, Southern
Ossetia, and Nagorno Karabakh; continuing armed
resistance in secessionist Chechnya and associated
Islamic radicalism; the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia
and Tbilisi’s subsequent efforts to realign with the
West; competition for access to the oil and natural gas
reserves of the Caspian basin—these kinds of factors
and more have ensured that the region would become
and remain a source of significant international
engagement and concern. Professor R. Craig Nation’s
monograph highlights the kind of conflicting interests
that have made Russian-American relations in the
region highly competitive. But he also addresses areas
of shared priorities and mutual advantage that provide
a potential foundation for more benign engagement
that can work to contain conflict and head off further
regional disintegration. However they are resolved,
regional issues emerging from the Caucasus will have
a significant impact upon the larger climate of U.S.Russian relations in the years to come.
Professor Nation’s monograph was presented at a
conference in Washington, DC, held on April 24-26,
2006, jointly sponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute
(SSI); the Ellison Center for Russian, East European,
and Central Asian Studies at the Jackson School of
International Studies at the University of Washington;
the Pacific Northwest Center for Global Security; and
the Institute for Global and Regional Security Studies.
It is the latest in a series of papers prepared from this
conference published by SSI. We are pleased to present
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it as a significant addition to the series, and a timely
contribution to the broad reconsideration of the factors
defining the U.S.-Russian relationship that is currently
underway.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
The Caucasus region consists of the new
independent states of the Southern Caucasus (Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Georgia) and the Russian federal region of
the Northern Caucasus, including war-torn Chechnya.
In the post-Soviet period, it has become one of the
most volatile and potentially unstable regions in world
politics. Fragile state structures, a series of unresolved
or “frozen” secessionist conflicts, and widespread
poverty generate popular dissatisfaction and political
instability. The region covers a major “fault line”
between Christian and Islamic civilizations, and
confessional rivalry, together with the rise of Islamic
radicalism, have become sources of friction. Despite
these inherent challenges, the hydrocarbon reserves of
the Caspian basin also have attracted significant great
power competitive engagement.
The United States and the Russian Federation
pursue assertive regional policies in the Caucasus.
At present, both Washington and Moscow tend to
define their interests in such a way as to ensure that
their relationship in the region will be contentious. The
questions of access to the oil and natural gas reserves
of the Caspian, Russia’s role in the geopolitical space
of the former Soviet Union, the Western military role
in the unstable regions along the Russian Federation’s
southern flank, and strategies for pursuing a war on
terrorism in Inner Asia all have the potential to become
serious apples of discord.
A zero-sum “Great Game” for leverage in so fragile
an area, however, is not in the best interests of either
major external actors or the region’s peoples. Nor does
it accurately reflect the dynamics that could be working

vii

to redefine the U.S.-Russian relationship beyond the
Cold War. Washington and Moscow should seek to
find a modus vivendi that will recast their regional roles
within a broader framework that allows for mutually
beneficial cooperation in areas of joint interest as well
as healthy competition.
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RUSSIA, THE UNITED STATES,
AND THE CAUCASUS
THE CAUCASUS REGION IN WORLD POLITICS
The Caucasus is geographically bounded by
Russia’s Krasnodar and Stavropol districts in the
north, the Araxes River and Iranian and Turkish
boundaries in the south, and the Black and Caspian
Seas. It is conventionally divided into two parts
separated by the Caucasus mountain chain. The
Northern Caucasus subregion is one of the seven large
Russian federal regions crafted by Vladimir Putin,
and includes the seven federal entities of Dagestan,
Chechnya, Ingushetia, Northern Ossetia, KabardinoBalkaria, Karachai-Cherkessia, and Adygea. The
Southern Caucasus includes the new independent
states of Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. These two
subregions are distinct but also linked by historical
experience, ethnic commonality, cultural and linguistic
traits, and strategic dynamics. The Caucasus meets
Buzan’s criteria for designation as a security complex,
and thinking of the region in those terms can help us
to understand the particular security challenges that it
presents.1
The Caucasus region is characterized by ethnic,
linguistic, and cultural diversity. The Northern
Caucasus is one of the most ethnically complex regions
in the world. Dagestan, with a population of about 2
million, contains more than 30 distinct ethno-linguistic
groups.2 Ethnic complexity is less pronounced in
the Southern Caucasus, but not less real. Georgia’s
population is approximately 65 percent Georgian,
but the Georgians have important local affiliations



(Kartvelians, Mingrelians, Svans, Ajars), and there
are Armenian, Azeri, Osset, Greek, and Abhkaz
minorities. Azerbaijan is 90 percent Azeri, but contains
a significant Armenian minority in the Javakh district.
The Azeris are a multistate nation, and perhaps as
many as 20 million Azeris reside in neighboring Iran.
Armenia is 95 percent Armenian, but its population
also has local identities. The large Armenian Diaspora
is a significant and sometimes divisive domestic
political factor. The region is also a point of intersection
between confessional communities. About 80 percent
of Azeris affiliate with Shia Islam, and there are other
Shia communities, including the Talysh of Azerbaijan
and some Dagestanis. Most Dagestanis associate
with Sunni Islam, as do the Chechen and Ingush,
the Circassian peoples (the Adyge, Cherkess, and
Kabardins), about 20 percent of the Osset population,
and 35 percent of Abkhaz. The Georgian Orthodox
and Armenian Monophysite churches are among the
world’s oldest organized Christian communities, and
the majority of Ossets are Orthodox Christians as is
the region’s Slavic population. There also are small
Jewish communities including the Tats (Mountain
Jews) of Azerbaijan, and in Dagestan. Historically, the
region has been fragmented politically and dominated
by adjacent power centers (the Persian, Ottoman, and
Russian empires). The Caucasus never has developed
functional regional institutions or a shared political
identity. In the post-Cold War era, the Caucasus
has remained underdeveloped institutionally and
relatively impoverished. The region as a whole is
plagued by many of the typical dilemmas of postSovietism, including incomplete nation-building,
cultural disorientation, deeply rooted corruption, socioeconomic and environmental disintegration, regional



conflict and separatism, fragile democratization, and
flourishing criminal networks. Despite these problems,
however, the region’s strategic significance in many
ways has become more pronounced.
The strategic weight accorded to the Caucasus rests
on several factors: (a) Regional Instability—the region
has been plagued by armed conflict and instability
with the potential to escalate and expand; (b) Islamic
Radicalism—the Caucasus covers an important “fault
line” between Christian and Islamic civilization,
has been plagued by local conflict with a religious
dimension and risks becoming a potential zone of
engagement for Islamist extremism; (c) Embedded
Criminality—poverty and the weakness of the Soviet
successor states have allowed the region to be
transformed into a transit corridor for various kinds
of criminal trafficking; and (d) Strategic Resources—the
oil and natural gas resources of the Caspian basin have
become a much sought after prize, and the Caucasus
represents a logical corridor of access for transporting
these resources into world markets. These factors have
made the Caspian an apple of discord between great
powers, notably the Russian Federation and the United
States, which have crafted assertive regional policies
on the basis of conflicting definitions of interests. The
resultant competition is sometimes referred to as a part
of the “new great game” for geopolitical leverage in
the “arc of crisis” along Russia’s southern flank.3
Similar to the modern Balkans, the Caucasus is an
area where the dilemmas of post-communism, regional
order, and geostrategic orientation are sharp and
unresolved. It is attached to the greater Middle East
geographically and by the Islamic factor; to Europe
by institutions (the Organization for Security and
Cooperation in Europe [OSCE], the Council of Europe,



the European Union [EU], the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization [NATO] and the Partnership for Peace
[PfP]) and the aspirations of elites; and to the Russian
north by economic dependencies and complex cultural
and demographic affiliations. It is, like the modern
Middle East, a region with important oil and natural
gas holdings, but with traditions of authoritarian
governance, the profound dilemma of frustrated
modernization, and a large number of unresolved local
disputes.
SECURITY CHALLENGES
The most important object of discord undoubtedly
has been the hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian
basin. Azerbaijan is a major oil producer, and the
Caucasus as a whole represents an important potential
transit corridor for bringing Caspian oil and natural
gas into regional and global markets. The region serves
as a point of transit in a larger sense as well, as part of
an emerging transportation artery defined by the EU’s
Transport Corridor Europe Caucasus Asia (TRACECA)
project. Launched by the EU in 1993, TRACECA
includes a series of infrastructure initiatives including
the construction of highways, railroads, fiber optic
cables, and oil and gas pipelines, as well as a targeted
expansion of exports, intended to recreate the Silk Road
of the medieval centuries binding Europe to Asia. The
Caucasus also has become a route for the east-west
drug trade and other kinds of criminal trafficking.4 In
the post-Soviet period, it has been highly unstable, with
four unresolved armed conflicts in place, all related to
the attempt by small, ethnically defined enclaves to
assert independence from larger metropolitan states
(the cases of Chechnya, Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia,
and Nagorno-Karabakh).


The states of the Southern Caucasus are weak
and actively have courted the support of great power
sponsors—the competitive engagement of external
powers is a significant part of the region’s security
profile. Russia has an obvious motivation to restore
order on its national territory in Chechnya, and to
promote a positive regional balance supporting its
national purpose to the south. The Chechnya conflict, in
particular, has raised the specter of Islamist terrorism,
and threatened repeatedly to spill over beyond the
boundaries of Chechnya itself. But the weakened
Russian Federation of the post-Soviet era has not
been strong enough to sustain the region as a closed
preserve as it has done in the past. The “power vacuum
created by the Soviet collapse provided an inviting
milieu for the West’s political and economic intrusion
into an uncharted territory.”5 The United States has
been drawn to the window of opportunity to forward
a policy of reducing Russian influence and promoting
the sovereignty of the new independent states and
“geopolitical pluralism” within the post-Soviet space;
assuring access to the resources of the Caspian; and
securing regional allies and potential military access
(over-flight and potential basing), extending its strategic
reach into Inner Asia. The EU has become attracted by
the transit of energy resources and concerned by the
challenges of trafficking and criminality that regional
instability aggravates. In July 2003 the European
Council appointed Finnish diplomat Heiki Talvitie as
EU Special Representative to the region. In 2004 the
states of the Southern Caucasus were made subjects of
the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), allowing
the negotiation of bilateral “Action Plans” to permit
states without immediate prospects for accession to
take advantage of more limited forms of association.



Iran and Turkey also have sought to sponsor local
clients in search of strategic leverage. The Caucasus
indeed has become part of a new great game, or
“tournament of shadows” in Russian parlance, played
for high geopolitical stakes, that is alive and well in
the Caspian, Black Sea, and Inner Asian arenas. It has
taken on a strategic weight that is incommensurate
with its inherent fragility, and potentially dangerous
in its consequences.
The War in Chechnya.
The massacre of innocents in Beslan in September
2004 seemed to expose the futility of Russia’s pursuit of
a military victory in the embattled Northern Caucasus.
Beslan was the latest of at least a dozen major terrorist
incidents in Russia since 1995, the fifth hostage-taking
event in that period, and the worst hostage-seizure
in history in terms of its consequences.6 Russia’s
strategy for reasserting control in Chechnya through
“Chechenization,” combining a harsh anti-insurgency
campaign with the effort to impose a Russia-true
Chechen leadership, seemed consigned to futility. The
result of years of counterinsurgency campaigning, it
appeared, was only more ferocious resistance. That
the attack was staged out of Ingushetia against a city
in Northern Ossetia seemed to be a blatant attempt to
expand the Chechen conflict throughout the Northern
Caucasus.7 In the wake of the incident, Chechen guerrilla
leader Shamil Basaev threatened new rounds of terror
attacks, including the use of chemical, biological, and
“nuclear weapons of various sizes.”8 Western observers
highlighted “the extreme gravity of a situation that
risks spilling over into the entire northern Caucasus . . .
unresolved from a military point of view and a failure
from a political one.”9


For many observers, the horrific nature of the
violence reflected as badly on the callousness or
ineptness of the Russian authorities as it did on the
perpetrators. Representatives of the Chechen
independence movement abroad were quick to
condemn the atrocity, but also to assert that the real
responsibility lay with Russia and the long campaign
of terrorist repression directed against a legitimate
national liberation struggle.10 A good deal of
international commentary, as well as Russian critiques
reflecting the perspective of the political opposition
to Putin, echoed that judgment.11 The death of elected
Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov as the result of
a raid by Russian Special Forces on March 8, 2005,
seemed to drive the dynamic of conflict even further
into a dead end.12 Maskhadov was viewed widely as
a legitimate leader and the only available interlocutor
capable of working toward a negotiated solution.13
Following his death, the terrorist Basaev assumed sole
leadership of the Chechen independence movement—
a man with whom negotiation was impossible.14
The appearance of stall was misleading to some
extent. In retrospect, the Beslan assault appears more
like an act of desperation by a flagging movement at
the end of its tether than the beginning of a new and
robust wave of terror. Russia’s counterinsurgency
campaign in Chechnya has been brutal and protracted,
but not entirely unsuccessful. The ability of the Chechen
resistance to mobilize the population and stage largescale military reprisals has been shattered. Russia pays
a price in blood and treasure for its occupation, but it
has not been forced to abandon it, or to turn away from
the policy of Chechenization that guides it. Moscow
remains concerned about the possible demonstration
effect of a successful declaration of independence



by one of the Russian federal entities. The example
of Chechen independence in the period 1994-96,
marked by appalling lawlessness and collapsing living
standards, was extremely negative.15 Russia has no
interest in once again toying with a scenario where,
in the words of Putin, “a power vacuum was created
that fundamentalists filled in the worst possible
manner.”16 It also is worth keeping in mind that the
second Chechen War, launched by Putin on his road
to the presidency at the end of 1999, has been linked
inextricably to his person and legacy ever since. For
Putin the statesman, nothing short of victory will do.
Basaev’s Islamist orientation and resort to catastrophic
terrorism as weapon of choice left him isolated and
discredited. They also have, to some extent at least,
encouraged strategic alignment between the United
States and Russia in the name of the global war against
terrorism.17
The Chechen conflict is not “frozen” in the sense
that the term sometimes is used with regard to
the latent conflicts in Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia,
Nagorno-Karabakh, and Transnistria. There is nothing
resembling a ceasefire and low intensity violence
is chronic. On May 16 and 17, 2006, a shoot-out
between authorities and a small group of insurgents
in the city of Kizil-Yurt, Dagestan, left three dead;
insurgents ambushed a Russian Army convoy in the
village of Nikikhiti, Chechnya, killing five; and a car
bomb attack attributed to the Chechen resistance in
Nazran, Ingushetia, killed Deputy Interior Minister
of Ingushetia Dzhabrail Kostoev and seven others.18
The Narzan attack was described by a headline in
Izvestiia as the possible beginning of “a new season of
terrorism”—certainly a possibility given the region’s
volatility.19 But it remains the case that the Chechen



authorities have not succeeded in controlling territory
and creating a convincing alternative political regime.
The assassination of Chechen president Akhmad
Kadyrov (elected under Russian auspices in May and
October 2003) at the hands of the Chechen resistance in
May 2004 was a blow to the policy of Chechenization,
but his son Ramzan Kadyrov has stepped into the
gap, the extent of violent resistance inside Chechnya
has been drastically reduced, and the policy is alive.
Escalation of the conflict into the volatile Northern
Caucasus remains possible, not least because the region
contains numerous flash points that provide dry tinder
for provocation, but diligent governance and oversight
can head off such worst-case scenarios.20 Is the relative
stabilization in progress inside Chechnya a “façade,” a
Potemkin village whose artificiality eventually will be
exposed?21 It perhaps is not yet possible to answer the
question with certainty. The Chechen conflict remains
dangerous, not least as a possible source for future acts
of catastrophic terrorism. In strategic terms, however,
for the time being at least, it might be described as more
of a nuisance than a source of dire preoccupation.
The Caspian Knot.
The saga of Caspian hydrocarbon reserves, already
long, risks becoming endless. Over the past decade,
assessments of the basin’s potential have ranged widely,
from predictions of vast reserves destined to make the
Caspian a new El Dorado, to pessimistic reassessments
arguing that production levels will likely be low and
the impact on world energy markets marginal at best. In
1997 the United States was estimating proven reserves
of 16 billion barrels of oil, and possible reserves of
up to 200 billion barrels.22 Such capacity would make



the Caspian basin the third largest source of oil and
natural gas reserves in the world, after Saudi Arabia
and Russian Siberia, and a potential “third hub” for
global demand well into the future.23 The figures were
compelling, and in a seminal public address on July
21, 1997, Strobe Talbott described the Caspian area,
and entire southern flank of the Russian Federation, as
a “strategically vital region” destined to become part
of the Euro-Atlantic Community, which the United
States could “not afford” to neglect.24 Military analysts
identified access to the Caspian as “a vital American
interest” worth pursuing, if need be, with armed force.25
The 1999 Silk Road Strategy Act defined the Caucasus
as an “important geopolitical isthmus” in conjunction
with its energy potential, and supported the effort
to reconstruct a Europe-Asia transport corridor that
would bypass Russia to the south.26
The estimates upon which such projects were
constructed were criticized from the first, but with
little effect.27 More recent estimates (also disputed)
have shifted direction dramatically. The region is now
being described by some as a “strategically negligible”
area whose long-term potential has been “deliberately
exaggerated” by “a spectacular bluff,” with reliable
reserves limited to 18-31 billion barrels.28 No matter—
the Caspian region has been elevated to the status of
geopolitical prize, and it is a status that it will most
likely retain.
Is it possible to come to some kind of reasonable,
consensual estimate of the Caspian’s real potential as
an energy hub? Several points of orientation can be
mentioned. First of all, the sea has not been explored
fully. The gap between proven reserves (modest) and
full potential (potentially significant) cannot yet be
fixed accurately. It, however, is clear that although
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the Caspian may represent a meaningful source of
energy supply, its potential does not approach that of
the Russian Federation or Saudi Arabia and the Gulf.
Nonetheless, the basin contains strategically significant
resources that can usefully supplement global supply
in ever-tighter energy markets, are especially coveted
as a potential reserve by a rapidly developing China,
and are of special importance to regional states with
limited economic prospects.29 Access to the energy
resources of the Caspian basin historically has been
monopolized by the Russian Federation. Efforts to
create a wider framework for access and distribution
therefore make good strategic sense.
The construction of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)
main export pipeline (initiated on September 1, 2002,
and opened in the summer of 2006), and a Baku-TbilisiErzurum natural gas pipeline (bypassing Russian and
Iran) directed at the Turkish market, represent U.S.led challenges to what was once Russia’s nearly total
control of access to Caspian resources.30 More recently
Washington has expressed interest in sponsoring a
Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) natural
gas pipeline, with Indian participation, to draw natural
gas resources onto world markets without reliance
on Russia. These are competitive initiatives, but their
impact has been diluted to some extent by the way in
which regional energy markets have evolved. Russia
retains considerable leverage and sufficient pipeline
capacity to sustain export potential. The TengizNovorossiisk pipeline, for example, is adequate to
transport the significant oil reserves of Kazakhstan’s
Kashagan fields, and Russia’s Blue Stream natural
gas link to Turkey is likely to supply a dominant part
of the Turkish market. Moreover, energy politics in
the Russian Federation goes well beyond the politics
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of the Caspian. Russian production has increased
considerably in recent years, energy revenues have
become the essential motor of Russian economic revival,
and Moscow uses its resource potential purposefully
in pursuit of national interests.31 In the larger picture
of Russian energy policy, the Caspian “great game” is
more like a sideshow. Secondly, declining estimates
of potential have taken some of the urgency out of
competitive angling for leverage and influence: “the
Caspian basin does not constitute by itself an area of
vital strategic interest for the West.”32 Nor are Western
interests significantly threatened. Russian elites realize
that the new Russia is not in a position to dictate policy
in the Caspian area, and that excessive pressure upon
the region’s new independent states is only likely to
encourage defiance.33
Russia and the United States could choose to
move toward a modus operandi that would allow
both to address their most important interests in a
nonconflicting manner, at least insofar as the logic of
economic advantage is made the decisive measure.
Unfortunately, this is not the case at present. Russian
sources assert that the flag follows commerce, and that
U.S. policy in the post-Soviet space “will not be limited to uniting the region with the Western economic system, but will also include political and military cooperation and a high degree of readiness to strengthen and
defend its position with the most resolute measures.”34
U.S. policy indeed has focused on reducing the Russian
and Iranian footprint in the region. The decision to build
the BTC, in defiance of the best council of representatives
of the oil and gas industry and in spite of the fact that an
Iranian route would be economically the most efficient
choice, has been described as a triumph of geopolitics
with an essentially strategic rationale, and in that sense
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“a prominent success” for the U.S. policy of “creating
an east-west transit corridor” intended to bind the
Caspian region to the West.35 As concerns the Caspian
energy hub, the United States and Russia remain rivals
for access and influence.
The absence of collaboration in the energy sector
affects the larger U.S.-Russian strategic relationship
throughout the Caucasus and Inner Asia. U.S.-Russian
collaboration in the war on terrorism, originally focused
on the elimination of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan,
has faded gradually as Moscow has reevaluated what
the relationship stands to bring it. The closure of the
U.S. military facility in Uzbekistan, and pressure to
impose timelines for a U.S. withdrawal from Tajikistan,
symbolize a turning of the tide. Both Washington
and Moscow now are seeking to cultivate competing
regional associations as sources of support. For years
the United States has encouraged the development of
the so-called GUUAM (Georgia-Ukraine-UzbekistanAzerbaijan-Moldova) organization as a counter to
Russian domination of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). More recently, Moscow has
attempted to reinforce the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO—Russia, Belarus, Armenia,
Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan) as a collective security
forum, and is considering the possibility of expanding
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (Russia, China,
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan)
toward South Asia, possibly to include Iran, Pakistan,
and even India. The recent decisions by Uzbekistan to
pull out of the GUUAM (now reduced to the acronym
GUAM), the refusal of Kazakhstan to turn away from its
privileged relations with Russia despite U.S. pressure,
Russian refusal to cooperate with the diplomatic
isolation of Iran in the context of the dispute over its
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nuclear programs, and generally improved RussiaChina relations have all made clear that, in the greater
Caspian area, Moscow still has significant policy levers
at its disposal. These setbacks for the U.S. agenda,
combined with continuing instability in Afghanistan,
have encouraged a sharpening of American regional
policy. In Lithuania and the Kazakh capital of Astana
during May 2006, U.S. Vice-President Richard Cheney
pointedly chastised Moscow for its purported attempt
to use oil and natural gas as “tools of intimidation and
blackmail” and urged the Central Asians to opt for
pipelines to the West bypassing Russia.36 Washington
also has floated a “Greater Central Asia” initiative
intended to bind post-Soviet Central Asia more closely
to a South Asian region where the United States has
greater leverage.37 All of these moves and counter
moves reveal the essentially competitive character of
the U.S.-Russian relationship in the greater Caspian
region. Business interests as defined by private
enterprise rather than national strategic goals provide
a promising foundation for cooperative and mutually
beneficial development. But whether the market will
be allowed to lead the way in the current competitive
geopolitical environment is an open question.
The Southern Caucasus and its “Frozen Conflicts.”
The three new independent states of the Southern
Caucasus rank among the most troubled and instable
to emerge from the Soviet break down.
Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan began its independent
national existence in the throes of a war with
neighboring Armenia. The outcome was the loss of
control over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave and a
substantial part of Azeri territory (perhaps as much
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as 16 percent) providing a corridor of access between
Armenia proper and Stepanakert. After some initial
political instability, including a brief period of proTurkish government under Abulfez Elçibey, in 1993
power was assumed by Gaidar Aliev, a strange political
hybrid who was a former member of the communistera Brezhnev Politburo, a regional power broker with
personal authority rooted in the clan structure of his
native Nakhichevan, and ambitious oriental satrap, all
rolled into one. Significantly tainted elections conducted
in October 2003, followed by a wave of protests that
were suppressed brutally, transferred the presidency
to Gaidar’s son, Ilham Aliev.38 Parliamentary elections
in November 2005, equally tainted, brought progovernment parties a large majority.39 Politically,
Azerbaijan is a prime example of a post-Soviet
autocracy where a democratic façade only partially
disguises the abusive control of a narrow ruling clique,
in this case representing a familial clan with succession
determined on the basis of primogeniture.
Geopolitically, Azerbaijan gradually has moved
away from the Russian orbit toward closer relations
with the West. Its oil and natural gas holdings, and
prospects for substantial economic growth, make it an
attractive partner, and the United States has pursued
closer ties aggressively. Other regional powers with
an eye upon Azeri energy holdings, including Turkey
and Pakistan, also have been active courting favor.
Turkey has sustained a special relationship with
Azerbaijan since independence, grounded in linguistic
and cultural affinity, as well as shared interests. The
BTC, which binds Azerbaijan to Turkey via Georgia,
was designed specifically to advantage Azerbaijan
and exploit its energy riches. After taking office in
2001, President George W. Bush moved quickly to
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use executive prerogative to repeal Section 907 of the
U.S. Freedom Support Act, which banned economic
relations with Azerbaijan as a consequence of its policies
toward Armenia. On the eve of the 2005 parliamentary
elections, Bush spoke publicly of the possibility to
“elevate our countries’ relations to a new strategic
level.”40 Already in 1999, Azeri Foreign Minister Vafa
Guluzade had called for the United States and Turkey
to take the initiative to create a NATO-run military
base on Azerbaijan’s territory, and in 2002 Azerbaijan
formally announced its candidacy to join the Alliance.41
The United States enjoys over-flight privileges in the
entire Southern Caucasus, and might be attracted by
the possibility of basing facilities in Azerbaijan that
would facilitate broader strategic access. Despite its
autocratic political regime and well-documented
humans rights abuses, Azerbaijan steadily has drawn
closer to the Euro-Atlantic community.
There are significant problems with these kinds
of scenarios for expanded integration. Azerbaijan is
a corrupt and dictatorial polity. Windfall oil wealth
by and large is being used to reinforce the status of
a deeply entrenched and venal post-communist elite
closely linked to the Aliev dynasty. Azeri oil production
is expected to peak by 2010, and it is not clear that oil
and natural gas revenues will be used with foresight to
prepare the way for more balanced long-term national
development. Azerbaijan usually is described as a
moderate Islamic regime, but moderation is achieved
at the price of severe repression of political Islam, as
well as other oppositional tendencies. Moreover, true
to the calculating and cautious policy crafted by Gaidar
Aliev, Baku has sought to maintain some balance in
relations between East and West. Moscow continues
to operate a military station for radio monitoring and
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early warning in Gabala on Azeri territory. Azerbaijan
has been a cooperative partner in the Russian
campaign against Chechen terrorism. Its relations with
the EU occasionally have been troubled by European
criticism of violation of democratic norms and human
rights standards, although Baku has welcomed the
opportunities presented by the ENP. Baku’s position
inside the reduced GUAM organization cannot be
taken for granted, given the more pronounced proWestern orientation of its Georgian, Ukrainian, and
Moldovan partners.42 Azeri Defense Minister Safar
Abiev has responded positively to a suggestion by
his Russian counterpart, Sergei Ivanov, that Russia,
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and Iran
pool their resources to create a multinational force to
patrol the Caspian basin.43 Azerbaijan is aware that the
United States can be a fickle partner, and has sought
to position itself accordingly. Ilham Aliev’s state visit
to Washington in April 2006 highlighted strategic
cooperation, but the Azeri leader was careful to specify
that Azerbaijan would not cooperate with any hostile
actions toward its neighbor Iran.44
The most significant unresolved issue hanging
over Azerbaijan’s future is the status of the NagornoKarabakh enclave.45 The Supreme Soviet of the
Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Region declared
its intent to unite with Armenia in February 1988,
and Armenia-Azeri friction subsequently became a
significant source of tension, paving the way toward
the Soviet collapse. On September 2, 1991, NagornoKarabakh declared independence, and between 1991
and 1994, with strong Armenian support, it prevailed
in a bloody war that may have taken as many as 20,000
lives and produced more than one million internally
displaced persons (IDPs).46 A ceasefire has been in
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effect since May 1994, but, despite many attempts at
mediation, the situation on the ground remains locked
in place.47 The reality is that for all intents and purposes,
Nagorno-Karabakh and adjacent territories have been
integrated thoroughly into the Armenian Republic.
Material circumstances inside the embattled enclave
are difficult, and there has been a significant population
exodus, but commitment to sustain independence
appears to be undaunted. Azeri and Armenian soldiers
in close proximity man the ceasefire line. There are
regular firefights and the constant danger of a local
incident sparking wider violence. Azerbaijan refuses
to compromise on the question of sovereignty or to
rule out the option of retaking the enclave by force.
Under the Alievs, it has sought to maintain its legal
claims to the territory, defined as an integral part of
the Azeri nation; sustain an intimidating military
presence surrounding the enclave; and wait patiently
while the influx of oil revenues make it stronger. With
Western support, Azerbaijan currently is engaged in a
significant force modernization program.
The balance of forces in the region gradually may be
shifting to Azerbaijan’s advantage, but there are good
reasons why a renewal of military operations would
not be in Baku’s best interests. A flare-up of violence in
the area could strike a serious blow at Azeri intentions
to leverage its energy resources on world markets.
The BTC pipeline runs close to the enclave and could
be endangered by sabotage. Nagorno-Karabakh is
supported financially by the large and prosperous
Armenian Diaspora and thoroughly integrated with
Armenia proper in economic terms. It is basically selfsufficient, thanks to the largesse of its metropolitan
sponsor. Conquering and assimilating the territory
would represent a major challenge, and could involve

18

the Azeris in human rights abuses that would damage
their international standing. The Armenian armed
forces are powerful and probably still at least a match for
their Azeri counterparts. Not least, Armenia’s strategic
alliance with the Russian Federation, and association
with a more dynamic CSTO, offers a deterrent shield.
Nagorno-Karabakh provides an excellent example
of the way that Russia has been able to make use of
separatist conflicts in the Caucasus region to further its
own interests. U.S. sponsorship for Baku has made the
relevance of strategic alignment with Armenia all the
greater, and the key to that alignment for the present is
the frozen conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh.
Armenia. A massive earthquake struck Soviet
Armenia in 1988, claiming over 25,000 victims, directly
affecting more than a third of the population, and leaving ruin in its wake. Armenia successfully established
independence in 1991 and won its war with Azerbaijan
over Nagorno-Karabakh in 1992-94, but at a high cost.
The shocks of natural disaster and regional war, the
rigid blockade imposed by neighboring Azerbaijan
and Turkey, and the disappearance of the traditional
commercial framework once provided by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) administered body
blows to the Armenian economy from which it has yet
to recover.
Today Armenia is in the midst of an impressive
economic revival, with annual growth rates of
over 10 percent led by new sectors in construction,
diamond processing, and tourism. It has a long way
to go. Its population, greatly reduced by migration
and demographically aging, remains massively
impoverished. Armenia is landlocked between Azerbaijan and Turkey, and has access to world markets
only through Georgia and Iran. Poor relations with
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its immediate neighbors leave it isolated in the region
and excluded from all major regional development
and pipeline projects. Popular dissatisfaction is
high, and Armenia has struggled with a turbulent
domestic political environment. The first president
of independent Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrossian, was
forced to resign in 1998 after releasing an open letter
urging concessions toward Azerbaijan in search of
a negotiated settlement in Nagorno-Karabakh. His
successor, Robert Kocharian, a hero of the war with
Azerbaijan and subsequently president of NagornoKarabakh and Prime Minister of Armenia, came to
office with the reputation of an uncompromising
hawk. Kocharian was elected in 1998 and reelected
in 2003. Both elections were seriously marred by vote
fraud and condemned as such by OSCE monitors.48
Independent Armenia has established a destructive
tradition of political violence, including a string of
unsolved assassinations. In 1999 an armed raid upon
the Armenian parliament, with obscure motives that
have never been satisfactorily clarified, resulted in the
shooting death of eight people, including Prime Minister
Vazgen Sarkisian and Speaker of the Parliament Karen
Demirchian. Kocharian has not hesitated to use force to
repress dissent. The Armenian Diaspora (particularly
devoted to the cause of Nagorno-Karabakh), the armed
forces (well-equipped, highly professional, and 60,000
strong), and the Karabakh clan from which Kocharian
derives are the essential pillars of his government. It is
no secret that the open-ended Karabakh dispute, and
the isolation to which Armenia has been consigned as a
result, are important barriers to prospects for balanced
development. But the Kocharian government is neither
inclined nor well-positioned to offer concessions.
Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian repeatedly has
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asserted: “the Armenian army serves as a guarantor of
Nagorno-Karabakh security.”49
The ultimate guarantor of Armenian security, in
view of its inherent fragility and substantial isolation,
is strategic alliance with the Russian Federation. The
Russian-Armenian relationship rests upon a long
tradition of association between Christian civilizations
confronting occasionally hostile Islamic neighbors.
It was reinforced by the perceived role of Russia as
protector of the Armenians following the genocide of
1915.50 Since May 1992 Armenia has been associated
with the CIS Agreement on Collective Security, it is a
member of the CSTO, and is linked to Moscow by a
bilateral Mutual Assistance Treaty. Russia maintains
military forces at two sites within Armenia, and its
forces engage in military exercises with their Armenian
counterparts on a regular basis. The presence of Russian
forces on Armenian soil has a powerful deterrent
effect—for all intents and purposes any attack on
Armenia would become an attack on Russia as well. So
long as Azerbaijan holds out the possibility of a resort
to force to recoup Nagorno-Karabakh, this kind of
deterrent function will be relevant strategically. Russia
is also in the process of establishing a more robust
economic presence. Trade has increased exponentially,
economic remittances sent home by Armenians
working in Russia have become economically critical,
and debt-for-equity swaps have made Russia an ever
more important player on the Armenian domestic
stage. Some see the trend as consistent with Anatoli
Chubais’ theory of “liberal empire,” according to
which economic presence is the real key to expanding
political influence.51
Armenia has sought to balance the powerful Russian presence by developing ties with other partners,
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with limited success. The EU has become more active
in Armenia since the signing of a Partnership and
Cooperation Agreement in 1999, and in 2004 all of the
states of the Southern Caucasus became subjects of the
ENP.52 Recent polls have indicated some public support
for a stronger European orientation, and inclusion
within the ENP has encouraged improved relations
with Brussels.53 Yerevan has established a high level
commission to explore avenues for cooperation, but
there are strict limits, defined above all by strategic
dependency on Russia, to how far rapprochement is
likely to proceed.54 Motivated in part by a powerful
domestic Armenian lobby, the United States provides
meaningful financial assistance, and in July 2004 the
U.S. Congress approved a parity policy allowing
$5 million in military assistance annually to both
Azerbaijan and Armenia. Armenia has reciprocated by
sending a small contingent of doctors, truck drivers,
and demining specialists to nearby Iraq. Yerevan
cautiously has probed opportunities for improved
relations with Turkey, without significant results. Iran,
however, is emerging as a promising regional partner.
For Teheran, also subject to regional isolation, Armenia
offers a useful corridor of access to the Black Sea area
and Europe.
These would-be partners see small and impoverished Armenia as the means to a variety of national
ends. Washington is interested in enhanced stability
along the BTC route, including, if possible, some kind
of resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute and
a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey (the
BTC route passes directly through the predominantly
Armenian Javakh area inside Azerbaijan); an expanded
NATO role in the Southern Caucasus (Armenia
has been associated with the Partnership for Peace
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initiative since 1995); and cooperative efforts to contain
the expansion of Iranian influence. The EU shares these
goals. Ankara also should share them to some extent—
the blockade of Armenia is one of many initiatives that
will have to be put to rest if Ankara’s timetable for EU
accession is to make progress. Iran is constructing a
gas pipeline to supply the Armenian market, and its
border with Armenia is a vital opening to the West.
Good relations with Yerevan are useful to these ends.
In no case, however, do the benefits that accrue to
Armenia from relations with the United States or its
regional neighbors, come close to matching the strong
cultural affinity and strategic dependency that links it
to the Russian north.
Georgia. Georgia has been the most contested state of
the post-Soviet Southern Caucasus.55 The brief tenure of
the ultra-nationalist Zviad Gamsakhurdia as President
at the end of the Soviet period provoked a series of
secessionist movements that resulted in declarations
of independence followed by military defiance of the
Georgian metropolitan state in Southern Ossetia and
Abkhazia. The Ajara district in the southwest also
moved to proclaim a kind of de facto sovereignty.
Ceasefires in 1994 brought the fighting to an end without
achieving any resolution of underlying differences.
In both Abkhazia and Southern Ossetia Russian
peacekeepers continue to monitor disputed borders.
Georgia insists on the premise of sovereignty, but is
too weak to act decisively to reassert control. During
the 1990s, the government of Edvard Shevardnadze
was forced to tolerate the existence of the de facto
states on Georgian territory against a background of
precipitous national decline. Vote fraud in the election
of 2005 led to the ouster of Shevardnadze as a result
of pressure from the street in the much-touted “Rose
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Revolution.”56 Subsequently, the new government of
Mikheil Saakashvili has struggled, with mixed success,
to navigate Georgia’s floundering ship of state,
described by Dov Lynch as “a bankrupt, enfeebled, and
deeply corrupt state, with no control over large parts
of its territory and declining international support” for
whom prospects “were bleak.”57
Saakashvili proclaimed the Georgian revolution to
be the prototype for a “third wave of liberation” following in the wake of the collapse of European Fascism
after World War II and the “Velvet Revolutions” that
brought down European Communism from 1989
onward.58 The ouster of Ukrainian President Leonid
Kuchma as a result of popular protests with strong
international support in the “Orange Revolution”
of November-December 2004 seemed to lend the
assertion some credence. Russia saw the events quite
differently, as an overt use of American soft power to
exploit dissatisfaction and impose pro-Western and
anti-Russian regimes in areas where it had vital interest
at stake. Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov condemned the
event dismissively (and not altogether inaccurately)
as “the forced ouster of the current lawful president
from office.”59 In the wake of the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine, a serious blow to Russia’s interests, Putin
advisor Sergei Yastrzhembskii put forward a conspiracy
theory that interpreted the larger phenomenon of
“Colored Revolutions” as a manifestation of American
grand strategy devoted to keeping Russia down: “There
was Belgrade, there was Tbilisi; we can see the same
hand, probably the same resources, the same puppet
masters.”60 Apart from any other effects, Georgia’s
Rose Revolution opened a significant new front in the
struggle for influence between the United States and
Russia in the Caucasus.
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Georgia always has been skeptical toward the CIS,
wary of Russian intentions, and attracted to strategic
partnership with Washington. Early in his tenure in
office, Saakashvili went out of his way to articulate,
in both Moscow and Washington, that a democratic
Georgia would not become “a battlefield between
Russia and the United States.”61 But his actions have
in some ways belied his words. The government born
of the Rose Revolution clearly has established the
strategic objective of reinforcing a special relationship
with the United States and expanding cooperation
with NATO.62 Its orientation toward the EU is much
less strong. Tbilisi has accepted the status of subject of
the ENP without caveat and not forwarded the goal
of eventual accession to the EU as forcefully as have,
for example, the Central European states of Moldova
and Ukraine. Its French-born Foreign Minister, Salome
Zourabishvili, described Georgia as a European
country “by default.”63 Georgia presently is engaged
in far reaching military-to-military cooperation with
the United States, high points of which include the
Georgia Train and Equip Program launched in 2002,
and the Sustainment and Stability Operations Program,
underway since 2005. It is reforming and bolstering its
armed forces under U.S. guidance.64 Tbilisi concluded
an Individual Partnership Action Plan to define guidelines toward eventual accession to NATO in October
2004, and seeks to move forward to a Membership
Action Plan with the possibility for accession as soon
as 2008-09. Since March 2005, NATO has been granted
the right of transit for military forces across Georgian
land and air space. In 2005 a new National Military
Strategy and the draft of a National Security Strategy
were released that unambiguously assert Georgia’s
Euro-Atlantic vocation and cite Russian policies
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as a primary threat to Georgian security.65 Military
cooperation with Turkey also has expanded, fueled by
a shared interest in the security of the BTC and BakuTbilisi-Erzurum natural gas pipeline.66
The course of the Colored Revolutions in both
Georgia and Ukraine has not run smooth. In 2004-05
the EU deployed its first-ever civilian Rule of Law
mission under the aegis of the European Security and
Defence Policy in Georgia, dubbed EUJUST Themis. The
results may be described as modest. Georgia remains
a deeply troubled polity struggling with entrenched
corruption and systematic abuses of authority. The
Saakashvili government has been criticized widely for
authoritarian proclivities.67 Its constitutional reforms
have enhanced presidential prerogative, and earned
round condemnation from the Council of Europe.68 The
economic situation remains dire, and the potential for
social and political unrest high. Disintegrating relations
with the Russian Federation, including punitive
measures imposed by Moscow designed to up the ante
for defiance (Russia has recently called for an increase
in energy transfer prices, and imposed an embargo on
the importation of Georgian wine, for example) do not
bode well for Georgia’s long-term stability.
Saakashvili has achieved some notable accomplishments. There is no doubt that Georgia’s international
stature has improved under his direction, and
prospects for democratic development have improved.
An accord of May 2005 committed Russia to withdraw
its remaining two military bases from Georgian
territory by December 31, 2007, a long-standing goal
of Georgian diplomacy.69 In May 2004, as a result of
Georgian pressing, the defiant Ajaran regional leader
Aslan Abashidze was forced to flee the country, and,
in July 2004, Ajara was peacefully reincorporated into
the Georgian body politic.70
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Georgia has made no comparable progress in
coming to terms with the separatist states of Abkhazia
and Southern Ossetia. The resumption of armed
conflict in Southern Ossetia in August 2004, including
harsh but ineffective Georgian military provocations, if
anything, has made the situation worse. Under pressure
as a result of U.S. inroads, the Russian Federation has
become more committed to support for the status quo.71
The separatist states are fragile, impoverished, and
criminalized, but they have been in existence for more
than a decade and are not likely to fold their tents any
time soon. Georgia refuses to rule out the “Operation
Storm” option of retaking its secessionist provinces by
force, but it is not strong enough to contemplate such
action. The United States has sought to discourage a
resort to force, fearing the possible effects upon regional
security and the integrity of the BTC.
Russia’s role in these secessionist conflicts perhaps
sometimes is exaggerated. Moscow did not create the
tensions that led to declarations of independence—
the conflicts are essentially about local issues—and
it is not in a position to resolve them unilaterally.
Tbilisi, as has been the case with Baku in regard to
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and Chişinau with
regard to Transnistria, has been reticent to address the
legitimate grievances and sensitivities of the peoples
in question. The Chechen question makes Russia loath
to unambiguously support secessionist provinces.
But mainstream evaluations note the weakness of
the Azeri and Georgian states as significant barriers
to reintegration, and describe Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, no doubt realistically, as “de facto subjects
of international relations.”72 The ability to serve as
external sponsor for the separatist states gives Moscow
real leverage in the region. So long as the contest for
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Georgia is defined on both sides as a zero-sum struggle
for influence, Russia’s motives, and policy priorities,
are not likely to change.
The Great Game in the Caucasus.
The post-Soviet Caucasus has not succeeded in
creating a functional regional security framework. Dov
Lynch speaks, no doubt optimistically, of “a regional
security system in formation.”73 But there is little
evidence of any kind of effective security interaction
relevant to the needs of the region as a whole.
Polarization along a fault line defined by great power
priorities not related intrinsically to the interests of the
Caucasus itself defines patterns of association in the
security realm. The resultant polarization contributes
to a perpetuation of division and conflict in an
impoverished and unstable region that can ill afford
the luxury.
Russia is engaged in a protracted counterinsurgency
campaign in Chechnya that repeatedly has threatened
to spill over into the larger Northern Caucasus region
and into Georgia to the south. It sustains a military
alliance with Armenia, keeps forces deployed in
Georgia as well as the separatist states of Abkhazia
and Southern Ossetia, and cultivates positive relations
with neighboring Iran. Since the Rose Revolution
in Georgia, Moscow’s presence in Abkhazia and
Southern Ossetia has expanded, and the dependence
of the separatist entities upon Russian sponsorship
has grown stronger. Azerbaijan and Georgia have
cultivated the geopolitical sponsorship of the United
States, and are linked militarily to the United States,
Turkey, and key European powers, including Germany
and the United Kingdom. Azerbaijan sustains a close
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relationship with neighboring Turkey, which joins
it in imposing a costly boycott on Armenia. Georgia
is pushing an agenda for NATO accession, with U.S.
support. The pipeline politics of the Caspian basin
remains a source of discord, with the United States and
Russia sponsoring competing frameworks for access
and market development. The EU increasingly has
become engaged in the Caucasus region, but it has not
established itself as an independent strategic partner.74
The European agenda in the region remains broadly
consonant with that of the U.S.-led western security
community.
U.S. regional goals seem to be to contain Russia;
isolate Iran; ensure some degree of control over the
hydrocarbon reserves of the Caspian and develop
alternative pipeline access routes; reward and sustain
the allegiance of regional allies including Turkey,
Georgia, and Azerbaijan; open up the possibility
of greater military access including possible basing
rights; and reinforce regional stability and resolve the
issues of Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia, and NagornoKarabakh by encouraging their reintegration into the
metropolitan states with some kind of guaranteed
autonomy. More generally the United States seeks
to project influence into a regional power vacuum
with the larger goals of checking Russian reassertion,
preempting an expansion of Iranian and Chinese
influence, and reducing Islamist penetration. These are
ambitious goals that will be difficult to achieve.
The Chechen insurgency threatens the territorial
integrity of the Russian Federation, and its containment
has become tied up inextricably with the political
persona of Vladimir Putin. The issue has major
implications for Russian policy in the Caucasus—
since October 2003 Moscow has claimed the right to
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launch preemptive military strikes against terrorist
organizations operating outside its territory.75 The
Islamic factor in the entire “arc of crisis” along the
Russian Federation’s southern flank has serious
security implications.76 Russia has important
investments and economic interests at stake in the
region. Its commitment to the exploitation of Caspian
basin oil and natural gas potential is considerable. The
perception of U.S. and EU encroachment designed
to detach the region from Russia and attach it to a
putative Euro-Atlantic community is viewed as an
assault on vital national interests. Russia consistently
has defined the cultivation of a sphere of influence (in
classic geopolitical terms) in the “Near Abroad” within
the boundaries of the former Soviet Union as a national
priority. The policies of Washington and Brussels have
challenged that priority. The ENP speaks of a “shared
neighborhood” (a phrase that Moscow rejects) on
the EU and Russian periphery, and in effect seeks to
cultivate the new independent states of Central Europe
and the Southern Caucasus as the Near Abroad of the
EU. The possible inclusion of Ukraine, in particular, in
the NATO Alliance has the potential to significantly
disturb the larger pattern of U.S.-Russian relations.77
TRACECA has been described as an initiative whose
goal is “the integral inclusion of the Southern Caucasus
in the American sphere of control.”78 American policy
in the Caucasus is perceived as revisionist, actively
seeking to change the geostrategic balance to Russia’s
disadvantage.79
The Russian policy response seems to be to use its
own instruments of soft power to reinforce dependency
(the “liberal empire”); to leverage support for separatist
entities in Georgia and Azerbaijan; to cultivate relations
with regional allies including Armenia and Iran; to
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stay the course in Chechnya in search of a mediumterm solution based upon the Chechenization scenario;
and to thwart Western designs where possible through
a combination of incentives, punitive measures, and
leveraging of local influence. More generally, Moscow
seeks to frustrate U.S. and EU encroachment, to
sustain its position as the Ordnungsmacht in a volatile
neighboring region, to pursue its economic interests, to
sustain the geopolitical status quo, and to contain and
if possible defeat embedded terrorism.
The way in which the United States and Russia
are defining their interests in the Caucasus region is a
recipe for protracted conflict.80 It is curiously at odds
with the larger framework of interests that could be
defining U.S.-Russian relations in the 21st century.
Indeed, U.S. and Russian interests on a global scale
can be interpreted as largely coincidental. Both states
identify Islamist extremism and catastrophic terrorism
as primary security threats. Russia is now a fully
converted market economy sustaining high growth
rates with a strong vested interest in sound and stable
global markets. As the world’s largest (or second
largest) oil producer and oil consumer respectively,
Russia and America have a shared interest in regulating
world energy markets to their mutual advantage. As
the world’s ranking nuclear powers, and the only
countries in the world capable of attacking one another
and wreaking major damage, they have an mutual
interest in promoting nonproliferation and cultivating
strategic stability. Both countries confront the dilemma
of power transition, and the inexorable rise of a potential
Chinese superpower, as a prime concern in the century
to come.
The United States has no vital interests at stake
on the Russian periphery, and U.S. engagement does

31

not place Russian interests at risk. The enlargement of
Western institutions such as the EU and NATO need
not threaten Russia, toward whom they manifest no
hostile intent. Enlargement, in fact, can be perceived
as a beneficial contribution to regional stability so
long (and this is a meaningful condition) as Russia
itself is engaged positively. The NATO-Russia Council
and EU-Russia Strategic Partnership represent steps
toward positive engagement, albeit, for the time being,
inadequate ones. Russia is not a predator bent upon
subjugating its neighbors.81 Its motives in the Caucasus
region are oriented strongly toward warding off further
decline and securing economic interests—the motives
of “a status quo power that is no longer able to prevent
or resist the rise of change.”82 The ogre of Russian
authoritarianism has been much discussed of late, but
Putin’s agenda for authoritarian modernization, linked
as it is to the effort to recreate a strong and purposeful
Russian state, need not be perceived as threatening
or destabilizing. The widespread presumption that
Putin’s authoritarianism is tied to “the concomitant is
rise of an increasingly assertive, neo-imperial foreign
policy” is just that, a presumption that may and should
be challenged.83 Russia’s attempt to defend its leverage
in strategically sensitive areas adjacent to its borders
is in some ways no more than prudent. For the United
States, whose regional presence is built upon the
weak shoulders of political regimes in Azerbaijan and
Georgia that are plagued by corruption, social unrest,
and abuse of authority, the attempt to achieve more
robust cooperation with a Russian regional partner in
areas where interests overlap might be an option worth
considering. Current trends are not positive, but they
also are not irreversible.
The “great game” in the Caucasus is harmful to
the interests of the region’s peoples who, more than a
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decade after the Velvet Revolutions that swept away
the communist past, remain trapped in a malaise of
economic decline, quasi-authoritarian governance,
widespread corruption, social demoralization, “frozen”
local conflicts, and great power intrusion. Intelligent
policy needs to think beyond the assertive, zero-sum
framework that currently structures competition for
regional influence, focused on the cultivation of local
allies placed at odds with their regional neighbors,
toward a mutual security model more appropriate to
the real nature of the Russian-American relationship,
more focused on the larger Caucasus regional security
complex, and better adapted to addressing the real,
human security imperatives that continue to make
the Caucasus one of the more volatile and contested
regions in world politics.
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